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I n tHE post-war period, Japan played an important and active 
role in creating and providing public 
goods and development assistance in 
the region, and in maintaining open 
and robust markets. For example, 
Japan effectively led the establishment 
of the asian development bank, 
and, together with australia, was 
instrumental in the creation of aPEC. 
but for the past decade or more 
Japan’s foreign economic diplomacy 
has stalled, and the nation is doing 
little to actively contribute to shaping a 
stable and prosperous region at a time 
when regional and global institutions 
are under pressure, in a state of 
transition and flux. 
Japan is a member of the G20, the 
preeminent steering committee for 
the global economy, but it has been 
missing in action in that forum as 
it hankers for the days when it was 
asia’s sole representative at the G7/
G8—a grouping that has outlasted 
its relevance, given that the global 
economy is no longer dominated by 
the rich club of advanced economies. 
Characteristic of its role in the 
G20, Japan’s economic diplomacy 
has been drifting. long-term 
economic slowdown has brought 
with it a stronger tendency of inward-
lookingness, exacerbated by the 
tohoku triple disaster of 2011. lack 
of political leadership and the inability 
to carry through the liberalisation 
of agriculture has hampered Japan’s 
participation in any meaningful 
foreign economic policy beyond 
narrow and relatively unimportant 
trade agreements. Those agreements 
have come in the form of economic 
partnership agreements (EPas) with 
developing countries that aim to 
secure Japanese investment abroad 
while generally avoiding opening 
markets so that agriculture at home 
can continue to be protected. 
Free trade agreements (Ftas) with 
australia and south Korea are being 
negotiated, a China–Japan–Korea Fta 
is under study, and an Fta with the 
European union is on the horizon. 
Japan has shown an interest in joining 
the trans-Pacific Partnership (tPP) 
agreement as well, but the main 
barrier to Japan concluding or joining 
all these agreements is its inability 
to reform key areas at home, most 
notably by opening up agriculture. 
it is often the case—perhaps 
especially so in Japan—that the private 
sector leads the way while government 
policy lags behind. That is true on 
many domestic issues, such as in the 
labour market, where the inability to 
reform has forced companies to hire 
part-time and non-regular workers, 
thus dividing the labour market in 
economically inefficient and socially 
unhealthy ways. internationally, 
Japanese multinationals have 
continued to lead the offshoring 
of Japanese manufacturing and 
development of regional supply 
chains. and the relocation abroad of 
Japanese companies of all sizes has led 
to policies that strengthen investment 
protection through EPas, not the 
other way around.
after multilateral liberalisation, 
bilateral or preferential agreements 
(such as Ftas or the tPP) are at 
most a second- or third-best option 
for trade liberalisation—and it is not 
clear whether they may have become 
the enemy of the first best. if the aim 
is (as it should be) to further open up 
protected and inefficient industries 
and make the economy more flexible, 
competitive and dynamic, a country’s 
priorities should focus on unilateral 
liberalisation and reform, from 
which it stands to gain the most. The 
difficulties with that strategy are not 
arguments for a strategy of narrow 
bilateral deals.
The purpose of Japanese trade or 
foreign economic policy is to increase 
the welfare of Japanese people and 
further Japanese interests abroad. 
The priorities in Japan are to open 
its economy to foreign competition, 
especially in services and agriculture. 
Japan attracts very little foreign 
direct investment relative to its size, 
and regulatory and other barriers 
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inhibit the kinds of flows that occur 
into similar industrial economies. 
as Japanese firms continue to move 
operations to China and the rest of 
East asia, the Japanese economy needs 
to continue to open up beyond its low 
tariffs on manufacturing goods so that 
it can benefit from deeper integration 
into the dynamic regional economy, 
especially with China.
Japanese leaders may need gaiatsu, 
or foreign pressure, to help initiate 
some of the difficult domestic reforms. 
This has been the case in the past. 
The tPP has been seen as just such 
a tool for opening up agriculture at 
home, bringing the weight of the tPP 
members—but most importantly the 
united states—to play as a lever. Given 
the political commitment to current 
Ftas, Japan could use them to help 
push long-overdue domestic reforms. 
That should be done not preferentially 
but in a way that opens up Japan to the 
world, not just to selected partners.
The multilateral trading system 
has been important for Japan’s 
development and its peaceful 
integration into the global economy 
in the post-war period. two examples 
illustrate that.
First, australia’s decision effectively 
to grant most-favoured-nation status 
to Japan in 1957—very soon after 
World War ii—and then extend equal 
treatment to investment and people 
movement in 1976 helped to secure 
Japan’s dependence on open global 
markets for raw materials and energy. 
These arrangements were bilateral 
but entirely non-discriminatory in 
character.
The second example is China’s 
accession to the World trade 
organization in 2001 and the process 
leading up to it. China committed 
itself to the global trading rules, 
something most clearly seen in its 
unilateral liberalisation and 15-year-
long process of showing the world its 
commitment to those rules, locking 
in reforms towards a market-based 
economy. Japanese companies could 
be confident in dealing with a China 
that was committing itself to the same 
rules and norms that governed its own 
international dealings. That’s what 
allowed the bilateral sino–Japanese 
trade and investment relationship 
to flourish, based on comparative 
advantage and mutual gain instead of 
bedevilled by divisive politics. Their 
unresolved history, regional rivalry 
and political differences did not 
prevent them from developing a huge 
economic relationship. an Fta would 
not have led to the same outcome. 
The importance of the multilateral 
framework for Japan underlines 
the country’s strategic interest in 
having a clear strategy towards 
regional and bilateral agreements 
that do not pick and choose partner 
countries to do business with in ways 
that hurt particular economic or 
political interests in the region. For 
this reason, it would be unwise for 
Japan to sign on to the tPP without 
signing on to the China–Japan–Korea 
agreement or a major East asian 
agreement (such as the asEan-led 
Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership), given the likelihood that 
China will not be a tPP member any 
time soon. China is, after all, Japan’s 
largest trading partner, and the same 
can be said for almost all of Japan’s 
other big trading partners. 
Re-awakening Japanese interest 
in helping to create both regional 
and global public goods could start 
with a more active role by Japan in 
regional community building through 
institutions such as aPEC and actively 
using the G20 to shape those regional 
interests.
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